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1. Introduction  
 A large body of literature documents that limited attention of financial market participants 
can affect stock pricing through a variety of channels.1 DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) posit that 
on Fridays investors are distracted by the upcoming weekend, which leads them to pay less 
attention to earnings announcements released on Fridays. As a result, price responses to Friday 
announcements are less efficient than to earnings announcements made on other weekdays. 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) document similar results for days with multiple earnings 
announcements and conclude that investors are able to pay less attention to individual earnings 
announcements on multi-announcement days, which is consistent with limited attention. 
Chakrabarty and Moulton (2012) identify a different channel – market makers’ limited attention 
– that affects stock liquidity. They find that on days when stocks assigned to one market maker 
have earnings announcements, there is a reduction in the liquidity of the non-announcing stocks 
handled by the same market maker. Together these studies show that decision-makers’ limited 
attention and the need to allocate this scarce resource across competing information sources affect 
financial market outcomes. 
 The common motivation for this literature is that human decision-makers’ attention is a 
limited resource. But the direct participation of human decision-makers in the trading process has 
been diminishing over time. In the past several years, equity markets have witnessed a 
revolutionary shift in the technology and speed of trading (Jain, 2005). Order submissions and 
executions now occur in sub-second increments. These are speeds that humans cannot even 
register, let alone react to. The latest trading hardware (chip) prepares a trade in 740 billionths of 
a second; by comparison, the blink of an eye takes about one-third of a second.2 Technological 
advances have dramatically increased trading speed, facilitating the proliferation of high-
frequency trading, a trading paradigm in which computers trade using algorithms with pre-
programmed logic. An estimated 40 to 60 percent of all trades in stocks, derivatives, and foreign 
currencies across all financial markets can be attributed to high-frequency trading (Sussman, 
2012). In the U.S. equity markets, over 50 percent of all trades are such high-frequency trades 
(Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014). By all measures, high-frequency traders play a large 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Chakrabarty and Moulton (2012), Corwin and Coughenour (2008), Damadoran (1989), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), 
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), and Patell and Wolfson (1982).  
2 For a discussion on recent advances in computerized trading, see http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/06/14/wall-streets-need-
for-trading-speed-the-nanosecond-age/.  
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role in the current trading landscape. Since these machines are not subject to limited attention, 
we ask: How does limited attention affect stock prices in today’s computer-driven markets? 
 Recent work by DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) provides an interesting segue into 
this issue. DeHaan et al. (2015) find that attention to earnings announcements is no lower on 
Fridays than on other days of the week. This result is in contrast to earlier studies by DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009) and Damodaran (1989), who document lower attention on Fridays. While 
DeHaan et al. (2015) do not explore the reasons for this reversal of the previously documented 
Friday inattention phenomenon, they mention the possibility that the trading technology of 
modern markets may be at least partially responsible.3  
In this paper, we test whether attention constraints still matter in a world where high-
frequency trading plays a large role. Our study is made possible by a unique dataset that identifies 
traders as either high-frequency traders (HFTs) or non-HFTs at the trade level. For our empirical 
setting, we choose corporate earnings announcements because they are events that are generally 
newsworthy and have been found to attract varying levels of investor attention in prior studies 
(e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; DeHaan et al., 2015). We hypothesize that since attention 
constraints do not affect HFTs, HFTs should not display the human tendency to ignore low-
attention announcements. In fact, the pre-programmed logic of HFT algorithms may benefit from 
human traders’ diminished focus on the low-attention announcements and find more profitable 
opportunities in these announcements.  
Since it is not possible to directly measure how much attention investors pay to an 
announcement, the literature on attention in financial markets has generated a number of proxies 
that indirectly measure attention based on trading volume, event characteristics, or investor 
actions. Studies using volume-based attention metrics (e.g., Corwin and Coughenour, 2008) 
reason that higher trading volume indicates greater attention and, conversely, lower volume 
indicates binding attention constraints. This interpretation implicitly assumes that all trading 
originates from human decision-makers. But since total trading volume in today’s markets arises 
from HFTs (who trade based on pre-programmed algorithms that are not subject to attention 
constraints) as well as human decision-makers, volume-based attention proxies may be 
misleading. Thus we rely on attention proxies that are based on event characteristics or investor 
actions. Specifically, we use the following non-volume proxies to identify low-attention earnings 
                                                            
3 See DeHaan et al.’s (2015) footnote 4, which alludes to undistracted arbitrageurs and algorithmic traders. 
3 
 
announcements: (1) days on which there are multiple announcements, as in Hirshleifer et al. 
(2009); (2) announcements after which analysts are slow to incorporate earnings news into their 
earnings forecasts, as in DeHaan et al. (2015); (3) announcements that are made on Fridays, as in 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); (4) announcements that are accompanied by many non-earnings-
related news stories, which are potentially distracting; (5) announcements that are made on days 
with lower download volume of financial reports from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC’s) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) facility as 
in DeHaan et al. (2015); and (6) announcements that are accompanied by low Google search 
volume, as in Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011).4 Because these proxies capture different aspects 
of the underlying attention phenomenon, we also construct an aggregate attention measure that 
defines events as low-attention if they are classified as such by many of the individual proxies. 
Using this large set of attention proxies, we examine the role of HFT trading on low-
attention earnings announcements. Our main hypotheses are that by trading on low-attention 
earnings announcements, HFTs diminish the previously-documented effects of low attention on 
stock price efficiency in both the short term and the long term (e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; 
Hirshleifer et al., 2009). We find support for these hypotheses using our aggregate proxy as well 
as several of the individual proxies. For example, while earnings announcements that occur on 
days with many announcements generally have short-term cumulative abnormal returns that are 
significantly less responsive to earnings surprises, this effect is reduced by 69% when HFTs are 
active in trading on the low-attention announcements. For the longer horizon, we find that greater 
HFT participation reduces the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) in prices following 
low-attention earnings announcements, completely eliminating the PEAD under some low-
attention proxies. We also conduct tests using post-close earnings announcements as quasi-
placebo events. Post-close announcements are characterized by low investor attention (DeHaan 
et al., 2015) but do not experience attention-related pricing inefficiencies (Jiang, Likitapiwat, and 
McInish, 2012). We find no significant effect from HFT trading on the post-close announcements, 
supporting our interpretation that HFTs’ effect is linked to pricing inefficiencies arising on low-
attention events, not the low attention itself. In robustness checks, we test small and large stocks 
separately to show that our results are not simply due to HFTs’ preference for large stocks (which 
typically experience less attention-based inefficiency).  
                                                            
4 Details of the attention proxies and their construction are provided in Section 3.  
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Finally, we investigate whether the documented improvements in price efficiency arise 
more from HFTs supplying liquidity to non-HFTs who want to trade on the earnings information 
or from HFTs themselves incorporating information into prices through their liquidity demand. 
We find that HFT liquidity demand and supply both account for a larger fraction of total trading 
on low-attention announcement days. A closer investigation reveals that the improvements in 
price efficiency are more closely tied to low-attention announcements on which HFTs’ liquidity 
demand relative to their supply is abnormally high. This finding suggests that it is HFTs’ ability 
to process and trade on short-lived information (such as textual news feeds about earnings 
announcements) that contributes more strongly to the improvement in price efficiency around 
low-attention earnings announcements.  
These findings make several contributions to the literature. First and most important, we 
advance the study of limited attention into modern financial markets, where high-speed computers 
are dominant players. We do not claim that limited attention no longer plays any role in financial 
markets; after all, trading decisions made by humans still account for a large portion of the total 
trading volume. However, given that in today’s markets a significant proportion of trading 
decisions are made by non-human traders, it is important to understand whether anomalies linked 
to limited attention are dissipating or disappearing. Our finding that these anomalies are attenuated 
in an environment with non-human decision-makers (HFTs) implicitly supports the original 
attribution of these mis-pricings to human attention constraints.  
Second, this work is related to recent papers that study how the profitability of anomalies 
changes over time (e.g., McLean and Pontiff, 2015). Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014) 
find that several capital market anomalies have attenuated in recent years as market liquidity and 
trading activity have risen, facilitating more arbitrage activity.5 Our study contributes to this 
literature by showing how the rise of the machines (HFTs), which is both facilitated by and 
contributes to enhanced liquidity and trading activity, reduces human-attention-based anomalies.  
Third, our study suggests that the rise of HFTs has rendered aggregate trading volume a 
less useful indicator of times when traders are paying less attention. We find that HFTs account 
for a larger share of trading volume during some low-attention times. Thus researchers using 
                                                            
5 In a similar vein, recent studies find that the declining profitability of the accruals anomaly is attributable to an increase in 
liquidity (Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2006) and a rise in hedge fund trading (Green, Hand, and Soliman, 2011). 
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trading-volume-based proxies for attention constraints may fail to find significant results because 
the changes in activity levels of HFTs and non-HFTs may (at least partially) offset each other.   
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on high-frequency trading and price 
efficiency. We show that HFTs play a beneficial role in making prices more efficient around low-
attention events, times when stocks have been shown to have particularly inefficient price 
responses. This result complements the existing literature on high-frequency trading, which 
catalogs several ways in which HFTs can lead to better market quality in general, including 
improved liquidity, lower transactions costs, and greater price efficiency. With the advent of “big 
data” in modern financial markets, the role of machines in both aiding and displacing humans in 
the trading process has attracted increasing attention and in some cases alarm (Hope, 2015). To 
the best of our knowledge this study is the first to examine the interplay between greater 
automation of trading and limited investor attention. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
high-frequency traders, discusses the role of attention in financial markets, and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, data sources, and key trading and attention measures. 
Section 4 presents our tests of whether HFTs reduce the effects of investor inattention on low-
attention earnings announcements. Section 5 presents our tests of HFT trading on post-close 
earnings announcements. Section 6 investigates how HFTs affect price efficiency. Section 7 
presents robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes. Appendix A defines all of our variables. 
Appendix B presents an illustration of how our HFT trading measures are calculated.   
 
2. High frequency trading, attention, and hypotheses  
We first discuss the institutional background on high-frequency trading and its role in 
financial markets. We then discuss the role of human attention constraints in markets. Finally, we 
bring together the insights of both streams of the literature to develop our testable hypotheses.  
2.1 HFT: Definition, growth, and effects 
 The SEC’s Concept Release on Equity Market Structure (2010) recognizes that high-
frequency trading is one of the most significant market structure developments in recent years. It 
notes that, “[b]y any measure, HFT is a dominant component of the current market structure and 
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likely to affect nearly all aspects of its performance.”6 Although there is no strict definition of 
high-frequency trading, the following characteristics are generally attributed to it (SEC, 2014):7 
 Use of high speed, sophisticated algorithms for generating, routing, executing and/or 
canceling orders. 
 Use of co-location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and vendors to 
minimize network and other latencies. 
 Very short timeframes for establishing and liquidating positions. 
 High volume order submission followed in quick succession by cancellations. 
 Ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying 
significant overnight positions). 
High-frequency trading began in early 2000 and has grown rapidly to become a dominant 
player in today’s markets. In U.S. equities, estimates of high-frequency trading come mainly from 
two private research firms: Rosenblatt Securities and the Tabb Group. Estimates from Rosenblatt 
Securities indicate that about 67% of all domestic stock trades between 2008 and 2011 were 
executed by HFTs, a figure that may have declined to about 50% by the end of 2014.8 In terms of 
volume, HFTs accounted for a trading volume of about 3.25 billion shares per day in 2009; that 
figure stood at about 1.6 billion shares per day by 2012. The Tabb Group estimates that high-
frequency trading revenue was about $7.2 billion in 2009.9  
 The growth of high-frequency trading has attracted increasing focus from regulators, the 
media, and academic researchers. The 2010 SEC concept release on equity market structures (SEC, 
2010), the Foresight Project on the Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets (BIS, 2011), 
and the MiFID II proposal are all regulatory efforts to understand the impact of high-frequency 
trading’s growth on market quality. In one of the first academic studies to examine the impact of 
HFTs on market quality, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find that algorithmic trading 
improves several measures of market liquidity – reducing spreads, reducing adverse selection, and 
enhancing the informativeness of quotes. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) find similar evidence of 
                                                            
6 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 FR 3594, 3606 (January 21, 2010) (“Concept Release”). 
7 The first two characteristics can also apply to sophisticated non-HFT traders, such as institutional traders using smart order-
routing technology to optimize their order executions. It is the last three characteristics that distinguish HFTs in particular. 
8 Matthew Philips, “How the Robots Lost: High-Frequency Trading’s Rise and Fall,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, June 6, 2013, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-06/how-the-robots-lost-high-frequency-tradingsrise-and-fall.  
9 Larry Tabb, “No, Michael Lewis, the US Equities Market Is Not Rigged,” TABB Group, March 31, 2014, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/04/01/larry-tabb-no-mr-lewis-the-markets-are-not-rigged/ 
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reduced spreads, higher depths, and lower short-term volatility associated with HFTs’ trades. 
Brogaard et al. (2014) find that HFTs improve price discovery in U.S. equities, a finding that 
Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014) confirm for the foreign exchange market, 
where increased HFT activity reduces arbitrage opportunities and return autocorrelations.  
In contrast to these positive effects, some recent studies suggest that HFT activity may not 
be an unmitigated blessing. In examining the Flash Crash of May 2010, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, 
and Tuzun (2014) find that although HFTs did not trigger the crash, they exacerbated price 
movements that day. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) build a theoretical model which shows 
that high levels of HFT activity can generate market exclusion for slower traders and create 
negative externalities. Biais and Woolley (2011) discuss the practice of quote stuffing by HFTs, 
wherein large volumes of quotes are placed with the intent not to trade but to quickly cancel these 
quotes, thereby slowing down public data dissemination. In sum, the net effect of how HFTs affect 
markets is yet to be established. Amidst this ongoing debate on the impact of HFTs, this study 
focuses on an unexplored issue surrounding HFTs: whether and how the effects of limited attention 
have changed with the rise of high-speed machine trading.  
2.2 Investor attention in financial markets 
Limited attention is a human attribute, and historically the primary decision-makers in 
financial markets have been human traders, including institutional portfolio managers, individual 
(retail) investors, and human market makers such as specialists. A large body of research 
documents the effects of attention as a scarce cognitive resource in economic decisions 
(Kahneman, 1973). For example, studies show that limited cognitive capacities can explain the use 
of heuristics in decision-making (Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg, 2006) and under-
reaction to information (Hong and Stein, 1999). Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang (2014) find that limited 
investor attention drives long-term return predictability following liquidity shocks. Such under-
reaction has asset pricing consequences and leads to predictable price patterns, including reduced 
speed of price adjustment (Peng, 2005), prices that do not fully impound all available public 
information (Huberman and Regev, 2001), under-reaction to earnings announcements (Hirshleifer 
et al., 2009), and failure to fully respond to profits and losses disclosed in corporate 
communications (Balakrishnan, Bartov, and Faurel, 2010).  
The delay in processing, or under-reaction to, information as a result of limited attention 
becomes especially prominent when there are attention-grabbing events or when multiple stimuli 
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demand attention. Barber and Odean (2008) find that investors more frequently buy stocks that 
come to their attention due to news announcements, ignoring non-news-making investment 
opportunities. In the context of price limit hits – an attention-grabbing event – on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, Seasholes and Wu (2007) find that the attention of individual investors, 
particularly first-time buyers, is attracted when price limits are hit. Graham and Kumar (2006) find 
that certain investors tend to trade securities following specific events that attract attention, such 
as dividend initiations. Lee (1992) directly infers that small investors’ buy decisions are associated 
with news events that bring these securities to their attention. 
Earnings announcement days are times of increased information in the markets (Beaver, 
1968; Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo, 2009; Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff, 2015), and stocks with 
earnings announcements generally attract more attention (Aboody, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2010). 
Hence, several studies examine hypotheses regarding limited attention in the context of earnings 
announcements. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) examine days with multiple earnings announcements and 
find that the immediate stock price and volume reactions to a firm’s earnings surprise is weaker, 
and post-earnings announcement drift is stronger, when a greater number of earnings 
announcements by other firms are made on the same day. Chakrabarty and Moulton (2012) find 
that market makers’ limited attention leads to lower liquidity for stocks when other stocks covered 
by the same market maker have earnings announcements.  
DeHaan et al. (2015) find that managers try to take advantage of predictable variations in 
attention by releasing bad news in periods of low attention. The issue of strategically timing news 
to exploit expected patterns of attention constraints is also explored by DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009), who find that Friday earnings announcements have a lower immediate stock price response 
and a higher delayed response in addition to a lower abnormal volume response than non-Friday 
announcements. Patell and Wolfson (1982) and Damodaran (1989) find that worse earnings news 
tends to be released on Fridays and after regular trading hours. 
2.3 Hypotheses  
We build on the literature that finds reduced trader participation and differences in price 
efficiency for low-attention versus high-attention earnings announcements. Our null hypothesis is 
that HFTs have no marginal effect on price efficiency for low-attention announcements. Our 
alternative hypotheses derive from the logic underpinning the attention literature to date: that 
human traders have limited attention or cognitive capacity and therefore tend to under-react to 
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certain earnings announcements. In contrast, we would not expect HFTs, which trade based on 
pre-programmed computer algorithms, to suffer from human attention constraints. Furthermore, 
the growing HFT literature suggests that HFT trading leads to faster incorporation of information 
into prices (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014), and HFT algorithms are known to parse textual news such 
as earnings announcements from pre-processed news feeds (e.g., Gross-Klussman and Hautsch, 
2011; Beschwitz, Keim, and Massa, 2015). In our context, this suggests that HFTs trading when 
human traders are distracted around low-attention events should induce more efficient price 
reactions. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Following low-attention earnings announcements, stocks with high-frequency trading 
should experience more efficient short-term price reactions than those without high-
frequency trading. 
If HFTs increase short-term price efficiency by incorporating more earnings-related 
information into prices, they may also reduce the long-term price drift associated with low-
attention earnings announcements. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that low-attention 
events with less efficient short-term price response tend to experience larger long-term price drifts. 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Following low-attention earnings announcements, stocks with high-frequency trading 
should experience more efficient long-term price reactions (reduced post-earnings-
announcement drift) than those without high-frequency trading. 
 
3. Sample, data, and measures  
In this section we discuss our sample and the construction of our high-frequency trading 
variables and attention proxies. Appendix A details all of our variable definitions, calculations, 
and data sources.  
3.1 Sample construction 
Our key data on HFT and non-HFT trading are obtained from a dataset provided by 
NASDAQ.10 The NASDAQ dataset includes 120 stocks, selected through a stratified random 
sampling procedure to reflect the dispersion in market capitalization of the universe of all firms 
                                                            
10 This dataset has been used in other academic studies e.g., Brogaard et al. (2014) and Carrion (2013). It is provided under a non-
disclosure agreement. 
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listed on NASDAQ and NYSE. The sample includes all trades in these stocks that occur on the 
NASDAQ exchange in 2008 and 2009.  
IBES and Compustat are the two most widely used databases to identify earnings 
announcement dates. We begin with the NASDAQ sample of 120 stocks, identify their earnings 
announcements dates from IBES, and match these announcements in Compustat. This gives us 
960 announcements, 937 (98%) of which have the same date in both databases. We delete two 
announcements where the dates in the two databases are more than 30 days apart. For the 
remaining 21 announcements, we verify the correct announcement date manually by examining 
company press releases and newswire reports. This gives us a sample of 958 earnings 
announcements (937 initially matched plus 21 verified by news sources).  
Recent work by DeHaan et al. (2015) suggests that mixed results in the earnings literature 
may be attributed to challenges in identifying the precise time of announcements. Bradley, Clarke, 
Lee, and Ornthanalai (2014) find that IBES timestamps are not always accurate. Since our study 
relies on announcement times in addition to their dates, we use two additional sources to verify 
the announcement times: Wall Street Horizon (WSH), which provides institutional traders with 
corporate event data, and Factiva, a leading source for business newswires.  
Of the 958 announcements in our sample, 781 (82%) have the same date and time in WSH 
and IBES/Compustat. There are nine earnings announcements that are either not covered by WSH 
or have different dates in WSH and IBES/Compustat. We verify the date for these announcements 
using Factiva. For another 168 announcements, the dates match in WSH and IBES/Compustat but 
the reported times differ by one minute or more. For these cases we use Factiva to verify the 
announcement time. For 130 of these announcements Factiva agrees with the WSH or 
IBES/Compustat time, and we use that time. For the remaining 38 announcements, we use the 
earliest timestamp among Factiva, WSH, and IBES/Compustat as the announcement time. We thus 
arrive at timestamps for all 958 of the earnings announcements in the sample as filtered so far.  
We impose the following additional filters to arrive at our final sample: (i) exclude one 
announcement made on a non-trading day; (ii) exclude two announcements with no trading in the 
NASDAQ dataset; (iii) exclude four stocks with no trading after announcement time on any of 
their earnings announcement dates; (iv) exclude 13 stocks that have no HFT trading after 
announcement time on any of their announcement dates; (v) exclude 75 announcements with no 
trades after their announcement time. After imposing these filters, we are left with 103 stocks and 
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745 earnings announcements. These 103 stocks have over 542 million trades, for a total volume 
exceeding 105 billion shares and a dollar volume of about $3.9 trillion in 2008-2009. 
3.2 HFT measures 
Each trade is the result of the interaction between two counterparties, one of which 
demands liquidity (a marketable order that immediately takes liquidity from the opposite side of 
the order book) and the other which supplies liquidity (the limit order that is sitting in the order 
book). NASDAQ identifies the liquidity demander and supplier in each trade as a high-frequency 
trader (H) or non-high-frequency trader (N). NASDAQ attaches the HFT and non-HFT identifiers 
based its information about the identity of each trader (which is not publicly disseminated). 
NASDAQ makes this determination based on the firms’ trading styles and also on the firms’ 
website descriptions. The characteristics of firms that have been identified as HFTs generally 
follow the SEC’s identification of HFTs, as outlined in Section 2.1.  
For each trade, in addition to ticker symbol, date, time (at the millisecond level), price, 
share volume, and buy/sell indicator, NASDAQ provides one of four possible trader-type 
classifications: 
 HH: Both the liquidity demander and supplier for the trade are HFTs; 
 HN: The liquidity demander is an HFT, the liquidity supplier is a non-HFT; 
 NH: The liquidity demander is a non-HFT, the liquidity supplier is an HFT; and 
 NN: Both the liquidity demander and supplier for the trade are non-HFTs. 
From these classifications we construct three measures of HFT trading and two measures 
of the interactions between HFTs and non-HFTs.11 Our first measure, HFTAll, captures the 
percentage of daily share volume that HFTs represent in each stock each day, taking into account 
both sides of each trade (liquidity demand and liquidity supply).  It is calculated as: 
HFTAll = (2*HH + HN + NH) / (2*Total Volume) ,                   (1) 
The numerator in Equation (1) captures the shares demanded and supplied by HFTs, and the 
denominator reflects the total number of shares demanded and supplied in total (which is equal to 
two times volume, since each trade involves a demander and a supplier).12  
                                                            
11 Our HFT measures are similar to those used in other HFT studies (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014, and Carrion, 2013). Because of 
market clearing, HFT and non-HFT trading in each category (overall, demand, and supply) sum to 100%, so non-HFT trading 
percentages are simply 100% - HFT trading percentages.  
12 We obtain qualitatively similar results using the HFT participation variable defined as (HH+HN+NH)/Total Volume, as in 
Carrion (2013). 
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Our next two measures capture the extent to which HFTs demand and supply liquidity in 
each stock. They are calculated as: 
HFTD = (HH + HN) / Total Volume ,                          (2) 
HFTS = (HH + NH) / Total Volume .                             (3) 
Finally, we create two measures of the interaction between HFTs and non-HFTs, 
distinguishing between which trader type is demanding versus supplying liquidity in these 
interactions. They are calculated as follows: 
HN% = HN/ Total Volume ,                      (4) 
NH% = NH/ Total Volume .                      (5) 
Panels A and B of Table 1 present descriptive statistics for our sample stocks and HFT 
trading, demand, and supply as well as interaction measures for these stocks. The cross-sectional 
statistics in Panel A show that the sample of stocks is diverse; this is by design, as NASDAQ 
intentionally provides these data on a sample of stocks evenly spread across the different market 
capitalizations. Over the two-year sample period, nearly all of the stocks have eight regular 
earnings announcements (mean number of announcements is 7.98). Panel B shows that HFTs 
represent 28.8% of trading volume on average. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Carrion, 
2013), we find that total HFT demand (32.8%) exceeds supply (24.7%). When trading with non-
HFTs, HFTs are more often on the liquidity demanding side (24.9%) than on the liquidity 
supplying side (16.8%). 
 [Table 1 here] 
3.3 Attention proxies 
To test our hypotheses we need to identify low-attention earnings announcements. We 
employ six non-volume-based proxies for low attention derived from the prior literature.13,14  
Our first proxy for low-attention earnings announcements is those that occur on the same 
day that many other earnings announcements are released, dubbed “busy” days.  Hirshleifer et al. 
(2009) find that investors tend to underreact to earnings announcements released on a busy day.  
                                                            
13 We note that these six proxies are not necessarily independent of each other, but rather are related measures designed to capture 
the underlying phenomenon of low investor attention. We examine their correlation at the end of this section.     
14 We do not use earnings announcements that are released after the market close as a proxy for low attention because Jiang et al. 
(2012) and Michaely et al. (2014) find that earnings announcements made after the market close have more efficient price 
reactions and a high degree of informational efficiency. We use post-close announcements as a quasi-placebo sample to 
differentiate between investor inattention in general and investor inattention that is associated with pricing inefficiencies (see 
Section 6).  
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Our second proxy for low-attention earnings announcements is those with slow analyst 
speed, as in DeHaan et al. (2015). Analyst speed is the speed (inverse of day count) with which 
analysts incorporate earnings news into their forecasts. We collect from IBES all analyst forecast 
updates within 30 days of a firm’s earnings announcement. Following DeHaan et al. (2015), we 
then calculate the number of weekdays between the earnings announcement and each analyst 
forecast update (j), take the average, and calculate the analyst updating speed as: 
ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐܵ݌݁݁݀ ൌ 	െ1 ∗ ݈݊ ቆ1݆ ෍ ൣ1 ൅ܹ݁݁݇݀ܽݕݏ	ݑ݊ݐ݈݅	݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ	ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁௝൧
௃
௝ୀଵ
ቇ	.					ሺ6ሻ 
Our third proxy for low-attention earnings announcements is those that occur on a Friday, 
when traders may be distracted by the upcoming weekend (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009).  
Our fourth low-attention proxy is a measure of news distraction. We posit that just as 
investors may be distracted when there are many different firms announcing earnings on the same 
day (Hirshleifer et al., 2009), investors may also be distracted from a firm’s earnings 
announcement when there are many non-earnings-related stories about the same firm on the same 
day as the earnings announcement. Firms may recognize this potential distraction: Miller (2002) 
finds that firms strategically release other discretionary disclosures with their earnings news. From 
Dow Jones Newswires (via Factiva), we hand-collect the number of new stories for each firm on 
each of its earnings announcement days, and within those we also count the number of stories that 
are specifically about the firm’s earnings announcement. We define news distraction as the number 
of stories about a firm that are not about the firm’s earnings.  
Our fifth proxy for low-attention earnings announcements is low volume of downloads of 
financial filings from the SEC’s EDGAR online system, which hosts financial filings by public 
companies.15 DeHaan et al. (2015) find that abnormal EDGAR download volume is a good proxy 
for investor attention. Similar to DeHaan et al. (2015), we compute abnormal EDGAR download 
volume as follows: 
ܧܦܩܣܴ	݀݋ݓ݈݊݋ܽ݀ݏ ൌ ݈݊ሺܧܦܩܣܴ௧ሻ െ ݈݊	ሺ	ଵହ ∑ ܧܦܩܣܴ௪ሻହ௪ୀଵ   ,      (7) 
where the first term is the natural log of EDGAR download volume on the day of interest, and the 
second term is the natural log of the average EDGAR download volume for the same weekday 
over the prior five weeks.  
                                                            
15 The EDGAR download data are analyzed in Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2014), and we thank the authors for sharing the 
data with us.  
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Our sixth proxy for low-attention earnings announcements is low Google search volume. 
Prior research shows that the search frequency in Google (the Search Volume Index, abbreviated 
SVI) is a good proxy for investor attention (e.g., Da et al., 2011; DeHaan et al., 2015). Drake et al. 
(2012) document that in the two weeks preceding an earnings announcement, the SVI measure 
shows a significant increase, and they interpret that as increased investor attention and demand for 
information. To construct our Google SVI variable, we proceed as follows. From Google Trends, 
we obtain the daily and weekly SVI values for each stock in our sample. We use tickers instead of 
company names as our search terms to ensure that we capture results that relate to the search for 
financial information for a firm (Da et al., 2011). The SVI numbers are ranked values that denote 
the relative popularity of a search term in the period (day or week) of the query. Google does not 
provide the raw search numbers for any search term; instead it first normalizes the raw search 
values by the overall internet search volume (popularity of that term vis-à-vis all other search 
terms) and then scales the normalized numbers by the highest value of the search term in the period. 
The normalization and scaling of the SVI numbers complicate comparison of these numbers across 
periods, as illustrated by Madsen and Niessner (2014). To make daily SVIs comparable across 
months, we follow Madsen and Niessner’s adjustment procedure and scale the daily SVIs (SVId) 
with the weekly SVIs (SVIw) as follows: 
SVI = SVId * SVIw / 100 .          (8) 
We use the natural log of (1+SVI) as our Google search volume variable. Following the 
literature, we exclude tickers that are common words (e.g., COST and GAS), as their search 
volume is inflated by searches unrelated to the stock of interest; this filter removes 12 sample 
firms. For an additional 33 of our sample tickers Google Trends returns no results because of 
sparse search volume. This is a common issue in research using the SVI measure. For example, 
only 56% of the firm-week observations in Da et al.’s (2011) Russell 3000 stock sample have a 
non-null SVI. In total, we are able to calculate the SVI measure for 58 of our 103 sample stocks 
(about 56% of our sample stocks). Thus our sample size is severely reduced when we use the 
Google search volume to proxy for limited attention.   
Panel C of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our six attention proxies. Of the 745 
earnings announcements in our sample, 60 (8%) occur on Fridays, similar to the 7.6% DeHaan et 
al. (2015) find in their sample of earnings announcements from 2000 to 2011. On average there 
are about 233 other earnings announcements on the day that one of our sample earnings 
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announcements occurs, and the standard deviation of 152 announcements is large. The average 
time between an earnings announcement and the average analyst forecast update is 3 trading days, 
with a median of 1.3 days and a standard deviation of 4.4 days. The resulting analyst speed measure 
has a mean of -1.04 with a standard deviation of 0.74.16 For comparison, DeHaan et al. (2015) 
report mean analyst speed of -0.96 and standard deviation of 0.54 for their sample. The average 
firm has 1.95 non-earnings news stories on earnings announcement days, with a standard deviation 
of 3.68. There are an average of 137 financial forms downloaded from the SEC’s EDGAR database 
daily, with a standard deviation of 175. The Google search volume index also displays wide 
variations over our sample of earnings announcements. 
We do not expect the six attention proxies to be independent of each other, as they are all 
related to the same underlying phenomenon of investor attention. Thus a natural question is 
whether the six attention proxies all identify the same earnings announcements as low-attention 
events. One of the proxies is a straight indicator: earnings announcements that occur on Fridays 
are considered low-attention, and those on non-Fridays are not. For the other proxies, we designate 
earnings announcements as low-attention if the value of the proxy is above or below (depending 
on the measure) the median of the measure for all earnings announcements within the quarter.17 
For example, if the median number of earnings announcements per day is 200 in the first quarter 
of 2008, all earnings announcements in that quarter that occur on days with more than 200 
announcements are designated as low-attention under the Busy Day measure. Table 2 displays the 
pairwise correlations between announcements identified as low-attention by the six attention 
proxies. 
[Table 2 here] 
While several of the pairwise correlations are significant, most are below 10%, suggesting 
that the six proxies for low attention capture different aspects of attention.  For example, low-
attention announcements under the Busy Day measure are uncorrelated with those identified under 
the Slow Analyst Speed measure (correlation of -0.022, p-value of 0.581), showing that slow 
analyst updates are not merely due to a heavy load of announcements all being released on the 
same day. The negative correlation between proxies such as Friday and Busy Day are not 
                                                            
16 Because the analyst speed measure is a nonlinear (in this case, logarithmic) transformation of the number of days, it is not 
possible to convert directly between the mean number of days and mean analyst speed, so we report both in the table.  
17 Low attention is determined by above-median number of multiple earnings announcements or news distraction, or below-
median analyst speed, EDGAR downloads, or Google SVI measure.  
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surprising, given the small number of Friday announcements in recent years (e.g., DeHaan et al., 
2015). The insignificant correlations between Google search volume and the other attention 
proxies are likely due to the large number of announcements for which the Google SVI variable 
cannot be calculated.  
To capture these different aspects of attention jointly, we construct an Aggregate low-
attention proxy using five of our six attention metrics. We exclude Google SVI from the Aggregate 
measure because the large number of missing observations for Google SVI severely limits the 
sample size. To construct our Aggregate low-attention metric we proceed as follows. First, we 
calculate how many of the remaining five proxies identify each earnings announcement as low-
attention (so each announcement has an Aggregate score that can range from zero to five, with a 
score of five meaning that the announcement is labeled low-attention according to all five proxies). 
Second, within each quarter, we designate all of the announcements that have an Aggregate score 
above the quarterly median as low-attention announcements. For example, Honeywell’s earnings 
announcement on July 18, 2008, is categorized as low-attention by the analyst speed, Friday, and 
news distraction proxies, giving it an Aggregate score of three. Since this is above the median 
Aggregate score of two in the third quarter of 2008, the July 18, 2008 Honeywell announcement 
is marked as low-attention under the Aggregate measure.  
 
4. High-frequency trading and price efficiency  
Our hypotheses are that high-frequency trading is associated with more efficient price 
reactions around low-attention earnings announcements. We examine both the immediate price 
response and the long-term price drift, since the literature finds both a lower immediate price 
response and higher post-earnings-announcement drift for low-attention earnings announcements 
(e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009).  
4.1 Immediate price response 
Distraction or low attention has been shown to reduce investor reaction (short-term 
cumulative abnormal returns) to earnings surprises. If HFTs step in and trade during low-attention 
periods, their actions should attenuate this inefficient response of stock prices to earnings 
announcements. We ask whether low-attention earnings announcements with HFT trading 
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experience more efficient reactions to earnings surprises than similar earnings announcements 
without HFTs.  
We begin with the Aggregate measure of low attention, and then test each attention 
measure separately with the exception of the Friday low-attention proxy. We are unable to test the 
Friday low-attention proxy separately because HFTs trade on all but one of the Friday earnings 
announcements, providing too little variation to examine.18 We run regressions of the following 
form:   
ܥܣܴ௜,௧,௧ାଵ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ 																																																							
൅ ߚସܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚହܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧
൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ 																																																							
൅෍ߛ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋ ௝݈,௜,௧ ൅෍ߜ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋ ௝݈,௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧		,										ሺ9ሻ 
where CARi,t,t+1 is the two-day cumulative abnormal return for stock i from earnings announcement 
day t to day t+1; LowAttni,t is equal to one if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention 
category given the proxy being used, else zero; HighUEi,t is equal to one if the announcement has 
above-median unexpected earnings, else zero.19 Unexpected earnings is computed as (Earnings – 
Analyst consensus forecast) / Price, as in DeHaan et al. (2015), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009).20 HFTi,t is equal to one if there is HFT trading following the earnings 
announcement on day t, else zero.21 Controlj,i,t includes market capitalization and earnings surprise 
volatility over the prior four years (both as in DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). We also include month 
and year indicators to control for differences in return sensitivity across quarters and within a 
quarter. All controls are interacted with HighUEi,t, and standard errors are clustered by 
announcement day to control for correlation of returns on the same day.  
The main estimate of interest is the coefficient on the three-way interacted term 
LowAttni,t*HighUEi,t*HFTi,t. This coefficient captures the marginal effect of HFTs on the response 
                                                            
18 We note that this lack of variability is caused by HFTs trading (rather than HFTs not trading) during these low-attention earnings 
events, which is in itself consistent with our conjecture that HFTs are less likely to be distracted from trading on Fridays. 
19 Our limited sample size precludes using the finer quantile distinctions of earlier studies, which had the benefit of larger samples.  
20 Kothari (2001) points out that analyst forecasts are believed to be “a better surrogate for the market’s expectations than time-
series forecasts” (page 153).     
21 For example, if stock i has an earnings announcement at 10:00 am on day t, the variable HFTi,t is equal to one if stock i has any 
trades involving HFT between 10:00 am and midnight on day t, else zero. Using a fixed two-hour period after the announcement, 
rather than the rest of the day, yields identical inference; see robustness checks in Section 7.  
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of the cumulative abnormal return to high unexpected earnings in low-attention earnings 
announcements. Our first hypothesis predicts that the presence of HFTs increases short-term price 
efficiency, meaning that cumulative abnormal returns are more responsive to unexpected earnings, 
all else equal. This predicts a positive coefficient on the three-way interacted term. Table 3 presents 
the regression results. 
[Table 3 here] 
The results for the aggregate attention proxy, in the first column, provide support for our 
hypothesis. The coefficient estimate for the triple interaction term LowAttn*HighUE*HFT is 
positive (0.173) and significant (p-value <0.001), indicating that earnings announcements 
identified as low-attention by the aggregate metric have greater short-term stock price response to 
earnings surprises when they have HFT trading. The negative marginal effect of low attention 
without HFT (the coefficient of -0.165 on LowAttn*HighUE) is consistent with the findings in the 
previous literature that earnings surprises during low-attention times garner lower short-term stock 
price responses, as distracted investors under-react to earnings surprises. Figure 1 graphs the 
marginal effects with and without HFT trading from Table 3.   
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows that in general, the presence of HFTs attenuates the effect of low-attention 
on earnings announcements, reducing the under-reaction that occurs on low-attention 
announcements without HFTs. The effect is statistically significant for the aggregate, busy day, 
slow analyst speed, and low EDGAR download attention proxies, with the reductions ranging from 
69% for the busy day proxy (dividing the marginal HFT effect, LowAttn*HighUE*HFT, by the 
classic attention effect without HFTs, LowAttn*HighUE, or 0.066/-0.095 = -69%) to over 100% 
for the aggregate proxy. Results for the high news distraction and low Google search proxies are 
insignificant. Statistical power of the tests to detect significance is likely the main problem for the 
Google search proxy, as Google search volume is available for only 56% of our sample stocks.   
4.2 Long-term price drift 
The results documented in the previous section suggest that the participation of HFTs in 
trading on low-attention earnings announcements tempers the inefficiency in short-term price 
responses to unexpected earnings, consistent with our first hypothesis. Our second hypothesis 
predicts that the greater efficiency of short-term price responses leaves less scope for a longer-
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term price drift for low-attention earnings announcements with greater HFT participation. To test 
this, we estimate regressions of the form: 
ܥܣܴ௜,௧ାଶ,௧ାସହ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ 																																																							
൅ ߚସܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߚହܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧
൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋ݓܣݐݐ݊௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ∙ ܪܨ ௜ܶ,௧ 																																																							
൅෍ߛ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋ ௝݈,௜,௧ ൅෍ߜ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋ ௝݈,௜,௧ ∙ ܪ݄ܷ݅݃ܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧		,										ሺ10ሻ 
where CARi,t+2, t+45  is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i from day two to day 45 after the 
earnings announcement (the post-earnings-announcement drift, or PEAD), and all other variables 
are as defined in equation (9). As before, the main coefficient of interest is the coefficient ߚ଻ on 
the three-way interacted term LowAttni,t*HighUEi,t*HFTi,t. In this specification, ߚ଻	captures the 
marginal effect of HFTs on the post-earnings-announcement drift after low-attention earnings 
announcements with high earnings surprises. Our second hypothesis predicts that the presence of 
HFTs increases price efficiency, meaning price drift should be reduced when HFTs trade on low-
attention earnings announcements with earnings surprises. Therefore, all else equal, we expect a 
negative coefficient on the three-way interacted term. Table 4 presents the regression results.  
[Table 4 here] 
The results for our aggregate low-attention proxy, in the first column, provide support for 
our second hypothesis. For earnings announcements categorized as low attention under the 
aggregate measure, the coefficient estimate on our main variable of interest, the triple interaction 
term of LowAttn*HighUE*HFT, is negative and significant (coefficient of -0.208 with a p-value 
<0.001). This indicates that when HFTs trade on earnings announcements that are made on days 
with low aggregate attention and also have a surprise component, the subsequent PEAD is 
significantly lower. The aggregate PEAD results are driven strongly by busy-day and slow-analyst-
speed earnings announcements (as in the short-term price efficiency analyses of Table 3) as well 
as high-news-distraction and low-EDGAR-download announcements. As in the short-term price 
reaction results (Table 3), the results for the low Google search volume proxy are not significant. 
Figure 2 graphs the marginal effects with and without HFT trading from Table 4.   
[Figure 2 here] 
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Figure 2 shows that the presence of HFTs generally attenuates the effect of low attention 
on PEAD following earnings announcements with high earnings surprises. Among the five 
attention proxies with statistically significant effects, the reductions range from 79% for the high 
news distraction proxy to more than 100% for slow analyst speed. Overall, these PEAD results 
combined with the short-term price reaction results in Table 3 suggest that when HFTs are involved 
in trading on low-attention earnings announcements, both the immediate price under-reaction to 
earnings surprises and post-earnings-announcement drift are reduced, consistent with our second 
hypothesis.   
 
5. Post-close earnings announcements 
The intuition behind our hypotheses is that HFTs reverse the inefficient price reactions of 
attention-constrained human traders, and our empirical results so far largely support this premise. 
But another possibility is that HFTs always lead to higher immediate and lower long-term 
responses to earnings surprises, even in cases where human attention constraints do not cause price 
inefficiencies. To examine this possibility, we conduct a quasi-placebo test using a subset of 
earnings announcements that have been found to have low investor attention but not suffer from 
inefficient price reactions as a result of low attention: post-close earnings announcements.   
DeHaan et al. (2015) find that post-close earnings announcements are associated with 
lower investor attention, for example attracting fewer EDGAR downloads.  But in work that looks 
specifically at price efficiency, Jiang et al. (2012) and Michaely et al. (2014) find that earnings 
announcements made after the market close have more efficient price reactions and a high degree 
of informational efficiency.22 Jiang et al. (2012) address this apparent contradiction, pointing out 
that although volume is lower and fewer investors may be paying attention to post-close earnings 
announcements, those trades that occur are more informed on average. Jiang et al. further suggest 
that firms may prefer to announce their earnings post-close in order to achieve a more efficient 
price reaction, with informed post-close trades conveying information to the general public. We 
thus see post-close announcements as a useful sample to test how HFT trading affects price 
efficiency when human attention is low but price efficiency is not low.  
                                                            
22 In recent work, Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015) find that investors underreact to post-close announcements only when 
they occur on Fridays, and not when they occur on other days of the week. Only two of the post-close earnings announcements 
in our sample occur on Fridays.   
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About 39% of the earnings announcements in our sample are made after the market closes 
(i.e., between 4:00 pm and midnight). In Table 5 we replicate the analyses of short-term and long-
term price efficiency from Equations (9) and (10), replacing the low-attention proxies with an 
indicator variable for post-close announcements.    
[Table 5 here] 
Looking first at the analysis of short-term price efficiency in the first column, we see that 
the coefficient estimate for Post-Close*HighUE is insignificant, indicating that there is no 
significant under-reaction to earnings surprises that are released post-close without HFTs. This is 
consistent with Jiang et al. (2012) and Michaely et al. (2014) and in contrast to the low-attention 
proxies analyzed in Section 4. Likewise, the participation of HFTs around post-close earnings 
announcements with earnings surprises does not significantly affect short-term price efficiency, as 
indicated by the insignificant coefficient estimate for three-way interaction term Post-
Close*HighUE*HFT. Taken together, these results show that HFTs do not always lead to 
significantly higher short-term price reactions. Rather, HFTs appear to enhance short-term price 
efficiency only when low attention would otherwise lead to under-reaction (Table 3).  
The second column presents a similar picture for long-term price efficiency, with 
insignificant PEAD for post-close earnings surprises without HFTs (insignificant coefficient 
estimate on Post-Close*HighUE) and HFTs not significantly affecting PEAD when they trade on 
post-close earnings surprises (insignificant coefficient estimate on Post-Close*HighUE*HFT). 
Thus our conclusion remains intact, that HFTs enhance longer-term price efficiency when low 
attention would otherwise lead to higher PEAD (Table 4), but not when investor inattention has 
no discernable effect on PEAD (Table 5, second column).  
 
6. How does high-frequency trading improve price efficiency?  
So far our results suggest that HFT participation reduces the pricing inefficiencies around 
low-attention earnings announcements. A question that naturally follows is how the trading of 
HFTs reduces the price inefficiencies. One possibility is that HFTs account for a larger portion of 
trading when non-HFTs are distracted, in effect “filling in” for the distracted non-HFTs whose 
absence would otherwise lead to inefficient price reactions. Another possibility is that HFTs 
process the earnings news (by parsing textual news releases, for example) and aggressively trade 
on the information by demanding more liquidity than usual, and possibly supplying less (which 
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may or may not lead to an increase in their overall trading percentage). Finally, it may be that HFT 
presence aids price efficiency primarily through a liquidity supply channel, as HFTs continue to 
supply liquidity at a time when non-HFTs may not, enabling liquidity-demanding non-HFTs to 
trade on the earnings news. To distinguish between these possibilities, in this section we first 
analyze the percentage of trading done by HFTs and then investigate whether the price efficiency 
gains documented earlier arise from abnormal HFT liquidity demand or supply. 
6.1 HFT share of trading volume 
It is not obvious a priori whether we should expect HFTs to account for the same fraction 
of trading on low-attention earnings announcements as on other announcement days. The general 
intuition of investor inattention is that when human decision-makers (non-HFTs) are inattentive, 
they trade less. If HFTs largely trade with each other, the withdrawal of non-HFTs could leave 
them accounting for a larger portion of trading volume on days when non-HFTs are distracted. On 
the other hand, the decline in non-HFT trading may lead to a commensurate decline in HFT trading 
if HFT strategies are mainly tied to non-HFT trading – for example, for HFTs that are primarily 
supplying liquidity to non-HFTs (as in a market-making strategy) or seeking to profit by picking 
off the limit orders of slower non-HFTs. In such cases we would expect no change in HFTs’ 
percentage of trading. Table 6 compares mean and median trading percentages for HFTs on low-
attention versus high-attention earnings announcements, measuring HFT total trading volume 
(HFTAll), demand (HFTD), supply (HFTS), and trades in which HFTs demand liquidity while non-
HFTs supply liquidity (HN) and those in which non-HFTs demand and HFTs supply liquidity 
(NH). All measures are calculated based on trading from the time the earnings announcement is 
released until midnight the same day.   
[Table 6 here] 
The results in Table 6 are generally consistent across means and medians and across the 
five HFT measures within each panel, but the picture varies across the different attention proxies 
(different panels). When low-attention earnings announcements are defined by the aggregate proxy 
(Panel A), slow analyst speed (Panel C), Friday (Panel D), or high news distraction (Panel E), 
HFTs appear to account for a significantly higher fraction of trading. Meanwhile, Table 6 reveals 
no differences in HFT trading percentages for low-attention earnings announcements defined by 
low EDGAR downloads (Panel F) and low Google search volume (Panel G).     
23 
 
On busy days (Panel B), HFTs account for a significantly lower portion of trading volume, 
perhaps because HFTs’ strong inventory management concerns (Menkveld, 2013; SEC 2014) lead 
them to trade less in each stock when many stocks offer trading opportunities on the same day. We 
note that even though HFTs do a smaller proportion of trading on busy-day than on non-busy-day 
earnings announcements, their trading nonetheless leads to a more efficient response to earnings 
surprises (Tables 3 and 4). The fact that HFTs are associated with improved price efficiency on 
both busy days (when they trade proportionately less) and slow-analyst-speed announcements 
(when they trade proportionately more) suggests the need for a deeper examination of how they 
trade, which we explore in the following section.  
6.2 HFT demand versus supply in alleviating attention constraints 
To better understand how HFTs contribute to improved price efficiency following low-
attention earnings announcements, we analyze HFT liquidity demand versus supply behavior.  We 
focus on abnormal liquidity demand minus supply (rather than simple demand minus supply) 
because HFTs generally demand more liquidity than they supply (Table 1), and we are interested 
in how their behavior may differ on low-attention earnings announcements. In particular, we define 
a variable to capture HFT abnormal demand minus supply as follows:23 
HFTi,tD-S = 1 if HFT shares demanded minus supplied for stock i on earnings announcement 
day t is greater than the median for stock i on non-earnings-announcement days; 
else 0.  
We conduct price efficiency tests similar to those in equations (9) and (10), substituting 
the abnormal HFT demand-supply variable for the simple HFT variable used in the general 
analyses. We use the Aggregate low attention proxy in these tests. The coefficient estimate of 
interest in these regressions is the triple-interaction term LowAttn*HighUE*HFTD-S, which 
captures the incremental effect of HFT trading when HFT liquidity demand minus supply is high 
(compared to occasions when HFT liquidity demand minus supply is low). If the signs on the 
triple-interaction term are the same as in our main results (Tables 3 and 4), it would suggest that 
high HFT liquidity demand (relative to supply) drives the main results; opposite signs would 
suggest that high HFT liquidity supply is more responsible.  
[Table 7 here] 
                                                            
23 Constructing the demand minus supply variable using only the HFT/non-HFT interaction trades HN and NH, described in 
Section 3, yields identical inference.  
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 The results in Table 7 suggest that the price efficiency effects of HFT arise more from HFT 
liquidity demand rather than supply. The significantly positive coefficient estimate on the triple-
interaction term LowAttn*HighUE*HFTD-S in the first column (coefficient estimate of 0.053 with 
a p-value of 0.032) shows that when HFTs demand more liquidity relative to what they supply on 
low-attention earnings surprises, their activity more than offsets the general under-reaction to low-
attention earnings surprises (coefficient estimate on LowAttn*HighUE of -0.035 with p-value of 
0.079). A similar picture emerges for post-earnings-announcement drift in the second column: The 
generally positive drift for low attention earnings surprises (coefficient estimate on 
LowAttn*HighUE of 0.063 with a p-value of 0.019) is offset when HFTs demand more liquidity 
than they supply (coefficient estimate on LowAttn*HighUE*HFTD-S of -0.064 with a p-value of 
0.067). Thus it appears that HFTs improve price efficiency around low-attention earnings 
announcements primarily by demanding liquidity, consistent with HFTs processing and trading on 
textual news (as in Beschwitz et al., 2015), unencumbered by attention constraints.  
 
7. Robustness checks   
An important concern for our study is the correlation between HFT trading and firm size. 
Previous studies have documented that HFTs trade more in large stocks than in small stocks (e.g., 
Brogaard et al., 2014), and prior work on attention constraints has found that attention effects are 
lower in large stocks (Hirshleifer et al., 2009). Although we control for firm size in our price 
efficiency tests, it is possible that our results primarily reflect HFTs’ preference for large stocks, 
which also have greater price efficiency, rather than the presence of HFTs reducing price 
inefficiencies. To address this concern, we divide our sample into small versus large firms (defined 
as below- and above-median market capitalization) and test each subsample separately using the 
aggregate attention proxy.24 Table 8 presents the results.  
[Table 8 here] 
Consider first Panel A, which presents the short-term price efficiency results (days t to t+1 
relative to the earnings announcement). The coefficient on LowAttn*HighUE, the classic attention 
effect, is significant for small firms (in the first column) but not for large firms (in the second 
column), consistent with Hirshleifer et al.’s (2009) finding that attention effects are stronger for 
                                                            
24 The number of observations differs in the small firm and large firm subsamples because of data availability for the regression 
control variables and individual proxies used to calculate the aggregate proxy.  
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smaller firms. Notably, the marginal effect of HFTs, captured by the triple-interaction term 
LowAttn*HighUE*HFT, is significant for small firms, suggesting that our results are not driven 
by large firms alone.  
In Panel B we repeat the small firm/large firm subsample analyses for post-earnings-
announcement drift (days t+2 to t+45 after the earnings announcement). We find that PEAD is 
higher for stocks with low attention on earnings surprises only among the small firms (significant 
positive coefficient on LowAttn*HighUE for small firms in first column, not for large firms in 
second column) and that the marginal impact of HFTs reverses the PEAD among small firms. Thus 
the subsample analyses in both panels indicate that the HFT effect we document in the main study 
is not merely driven by HFTs trading in large stocks.  
Previous studies of the effects of investor limited attention on price efficiency have 
examined cumulative abnormal returns over various time periods, so we also test the robustness 
of our results over different time windows. Table 9 replicates the analysis of short-term price 
reactions to earnings surprises (in Table 3) over one-day (Panel A) and three-day (Panel B) periods.  
[Table 9 here] 
The results for the aggregate attention proxy, in the first column, provide support for our 
hypothesis in both one-day (Panel A) and three-day (Panel B) cumulative abnormal returns. The 
coefficient estimates for the triple interaction term LowAttn*HighUE*HFT are positive (0.047 and 
0.183) and significant (p-values of 0.026 and <.001, respectively), indicating that earnings 
announcements identified as low-attention by the aggregate metric have greater short-term stock 
price response to earnings surprises when they have HFT trading. At the one-day horizon, the 
coefficient estimates on the three-way interaction term are significant for the busy day, slow 
analyst speed, and high news distraction attention proxies (Panel A), while the low EDGAR proxy 
becomes significant and high news distraction loses significance at the three-day horizon (Panel 
B). The Google proxy continues to show no significant results, as in Table 3. Overall, Table 9 
shows that our results for short-term price efficiency are robust to different short-term horizons.   
Table 10 replicates the analysis of long-term price reactions to earnings surprises (PEAD) 
(in Table 4) over a 30-day horizon.  
[Table 10 here] 
The results for the aggregate attention proxy, in the first column, provide support for our 
hypothesis. The coefficient estimate for the triple interaction term LowAttn*HighUE*HFT is 
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negative (-0.148) and significant (p-value of 0.002), indicating that earnings announcements 
identified as low-attention by the aggregate metric have lower 30-day PEAD when they have HFT 
trading. The individual low-attention proxies based on busy days, slow analyst speed, high news 
distraction, and low EDGAR all show significant effects of HFT activity on low-attention 
announcements with earnings surprises, echoing the findings of Table 4 over the 45-day horizon.  
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of HFT trading.  
In Panel A of Table 11, we define the HFT indicator variable as having the value one if HFTs 
represent at least five percent of trading volume following the earnings announcement (instead of 
any positive volume in our main analyses), else zero.  In Panel B, we define the HFT indicator 
variable as having the value one if HFTs trade in the two hours following the earnings 
announcement (instead of the entire remaining trading day in our main analysis), else zero. Low 
attention is measured using the Aggregate proxy. The results in both panels are consistent with our 
main results.  
[Table 11 here] 
 
8. Conclusion   
In this study we examine the changing role of attention in modern financial markets. A 
large portion of trading in today’s markets is executed by machines that trade at millisecond and 
microsecond speeds using pre-programmed algorithms with little to no human intervention. The 
preponderance of these super-fast computers, known as high-frequency traders (HFTs), raises 
questions about the effects of attention constraints on price efficiency. Previous research has 
shown that the attention constraints of human traders (both investors and market makers) lead to 
systematic effects on stock prices. A number of papers have shown that when a firm announces its 
earnings at times of low attention, investors generally trade less in those stocks, as a result of which 
price responses are inefficient. 
Given that machines are not expected to suffer from limited attention or distraction, does 
this new type of traders – the HFTs – improve price efficiency during times of low (human) 
attention? Using a large set of proxies for investor attention, we answer this question. Our study is 
made possible by a dataset made available to us by NASDAQ OMX that identifies trader types as 
high-frequency and non-high-frequency, a feature not available in standard public datasets.  
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We employ six attention proxies and an aggregate measure to examine the participation of 
HFTs around low-attention earnings announcements. We find that HFT trading tempers the 
previously documented effects of low attention on stock price efficiency. We test both short- and 
long-term price efficiency and find that high-frequency trading on low-attention announcements 
is associated with greater stock price responsiveness to earnings surprises and reduced long-term 
price drift, specifically when human attention constraints cause inefficient reactions to earnings 
surprises. Our findings are stronger for small stocks, where investor distraction more often leads 
to price inefficiencies. While HFTs are active as both liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers 
on low-attention announcements, we find that that price efficiency improves more when HFTs 
are more heavily demanding liquidity. We thus conclude that it is HFTs’ ability to process and 
trade on news without human distraction that most improves price efficiency. Our results are 
important in that they highlight the changing role of attention in modern financial markets and 
reveal a previously undocumented positive role played by HFTs. 
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Appendix A: Variable sources and definitions
 
Variable Data source Definition
HFT Trading Variables
HFTAll NASDAQ OMX (2*HH + HN + NH) / (2*Total Volume)
HFTD NASDAQ OMX (HH + HN) / Total Volume
HFTS NASDAQ OMX (HH + NH) / Total Volume
HN% NASDAQ OMX HN / Total Volume
NH% NASDAQ OMX NH / Total Volume
 
Attention Proxies
Friday earnings announcements IBES, Compustat, Wall 
Street Horizon, Factiva
Derived from IBES variable ANNDAT and Compustat, Wall Street 
Horizon, and Factiva cross-check
Post-close IBES, Compustat, Wall 
Street Horizon, Factiva
Derived from IBES variable ANNTIM and Compustat,  Wall Street 
Horizon, and Factiva cross-check
Busy day Compustat Multiple announcements on the same day
Analyst Speed IBES
EDGAR downloads
SEC, via authors of Drake, 
Roulstone, and Thornock 
(2014)
Google Search Volume Index (SVI) http://www.google.com/trends/
ln (1+SVI), where SVI = SVId * SVIw / 100, and SVId = daily SVI, 
SVIw = weekly SVI
News distraction Factiva Count of (Dow Jones NewsWire stories for firm i  on day t ) - Count 
of (Dow Jones NewsWire stories about earnings for firm i  on day t )
 
Control Variables
Market capitalization COMPUSTAT Price*Shares Outstanding
Market-to-book ratio COMPUSTAT Market Capitalization/Book Value of Equity 
Price CRSP Share price
Spread CRSP Closing Ask Quote minus Closing Bid Quote
Dollar Volume CRSP Price*Volume
VIX
http://www.cboe.com/micro
/vix/historical.aspx Volitility index from Chicago Board Options Exchange
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) CRSP [(Pt-Ps)/Ps] - CRSP Value weighted market index over same period 
beginning at s and ending at t
Unexpected earnings (UE) CRSP, IBES (Earnings - Analyst consensus forecast)/Price, with price measured 
as of the end of the quarter in which the earnings are announced
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Appendix B: Illustration of HFT calculations
  
 
Consider the following set of trades in one stock on one day:
Trade # NASDAQ Trader-Type Classification Shares traded
HFT shares 
demanded + HFT 
shares supplied
1 HH 100 200
2 HN 200 200
3 NH 300 300
4 NN 400 0
Totals= 1000 700
Total shares demanded + shares supplied = 2 x trading volume = 2000
Variable Calculation Value
HFTAll HFT % = (shares demanded by HFT + shares supplied by HFT)/(2 x trading volume): 35%
HFTD HFT Demand % = (shares with HFT demanding liquidity)/(trading volume): 30%
HFTS HFT Supply % = (shares with HFT supplying liquidity)/(trading volume): 40%
HN% HFT Demand with non-HFT Supply % = (HN shares traded)/(trading volume): 20%
NH% non-HFT Demand with HFT Supply % = (NH shares traded)/(trading volume): 30%
NASDAQ trader-type classifications: HH = HFT demanding and HFT supplying liquidity; HN = HFT demanding and non-HFT 
supplying liquidity; NH = non-HFT demanding and HFT supplying liquidity; NN = non-HFT demanding and non-HFT supplying 
liquidity. 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
 
 
Panel A: Sample stocks 
 Mean Median Std Dev
Market capitalization ($ billion) 19.60 1.83 39.80
Market-to-book ratio 3.35 2.44 3.57
Price 36.47 22.32 50.72
Trading volume (shares million) 2.03 0.36 4.21
# Earnings announcements 7.98 8.00 0.14
Panel B: Trading volume percentages
Mean Median Std Dev
HFTAll 28.8 27.0 11.8
HFTD 32.8 34.5 11.4
HFTS 24.7 17.1 15.3
HN% 24.9 25.1 8.2
NH% 16.8 12.7 9.7
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 103 NASDAQ stocks over all trading days in 2008 and 2009.  
In Panel A, means are calculated by stock, and cross-sectional statistics are reported in the table. Market capitalization 
and Book-to-market ratio  are calculated from quarter-end values;  Price  is the average daily closing price of the stock; 
Trading volume  is the average daily NASDAQ trading volume; and # Earnings announcements  is the number of 
earnings announcements per stock in the sample period.  
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for HFT trading, with means calculated by stock and cross-sectional statistics 
reported in the table.  HFT All  measures the percentage of trading volume executed by HFTs;  HFT D  measures the 
percentage of trading volume in which HFTs demand liquidity; HFT S  measures the percentage of trading volume in 
which HFTs supply liquidity; HN%  measures the percentage of trading volume in which HFTs demand and non-HFTs 
supply liquidity; and NH%  measures the percentage of trading volume in which non-HFTs demand and HFTs supply 
liquidity. 
In Panel C, the first two lines report the breakdown of all earnings announcements, beginning with the total number of 
earnings announcements in the sample (Total ), and then separating out earnings announcements that are made on 
Fridays (Friday ). The remaining rows in Panel C present cross-sectional statistics across all earnings announcements 
for the number of other earnings announcements made on the same day ( # Other earnings announcements ); the speed 
with which analysts revise their earnings forecasts (Days until analyst update  and Analyst speed ); the number of non-
earnings news (News distraction counts); the number of financial form downloads from the SEC's EDGAR database 
(EDGAR downloads and the EDGAR variable); and Google search SVI variable,  measured as the log of one plus the 
Google Search Volume Index scaled for the two-year sample period. 
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Panel C: Earnings announcements and attention indicators
Total Fridays
# Earnings announcements 745 60
% Earnings announcements 100% 8%
 Mean Median Std Dev
Multiple earnings announcements 233 202 152
Days until analyst update (untransformed) 3.0 1.3 4.4
Analyst speed variable -1.04 -0.81 0.74
News distraction counts 1.95 0.00 3.68
EDGAR downloads (untransformed) 137 75 175
EDGAR variable 0.68 0.69 0.61
Google search SVI variable 3.61 3.78 0.77
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Table 2: Correlation table for low-attention proxies
Busy Day
Slow 
Analyst 
Speed Friday
High 
News 
Distraction
Low 
EDGAR
Slow Analyst Speed  -0.022
(0.581)
Friday  -0.205 ***   0.012
(<0.001) (0.765)
High News Distraction  -0.160 ***   0.054   0.025
(<0.001) (0.178) (0.502)
Low EDGAR   0.041   0.050  -0.150 ***   0.075 **
(0.277) (0.223) (<0.001) (0.045)
Low Google Search  -0.034   0.079   0.078  -0.007  -0.010
(0.473) (0.124) (0.104) (0.880) (0.842)
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients between earnings announcements designated as low-attention under 
the six attention proxies: Busy Day  signals announcements with an above-median number of announcements released 
on the same day; Slow Analyst Speed  signals announcements with below-median analyst speed; High News Distraction 
signals announcements with above-median non-earnings-related news;  Friday  signals announcements made on 
Fridays; Low EDGAR  signals announcements that experience below-median abnormal download volume from the 
SEC's EDGAR database; Low Google Search  signals announcements that experience below-median Google search 
volume.  P-values are reported in parentheses below the correlation estimates.
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Table 3: HFT and Short-term price efficiency
 
 
Low Attention proxy
 
Low Attention 0.100 *** 0.042 0.040 0.012 0.043 * 0.068 *
 (<.001) (0.116) (0.139) (0.698) (0.095) (0.096)
HighUE 0.015 -0.015 0.005 -0.064 0.010 0.027
 (0.736) (0.762) (0.916) (0.152) (0.860) (0.726)
HFT 0.028 0.005 0.021 0.002 0.019 0.017
(0.144) (0.790) (0.232) (0.884) (0.360) (0.660)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.165 *** -0.095 ** -0.089 ** -0.030 -0.085 ** -0.042
(<.001) (0.024) (0.039) (0.589) (0.047) (0.507)
Low Attention * HFT -0.094 *** -0.016 -0.050 * -0.027 -0.032 -0.075 *
(0.002) (0.555) (0.091) (0.398) (0.227) (0.081)
HFT * HighUE -0.037 -0.028 -0.029 -0.005 -0.046 0.009
(0.205) (0.395) (0.296) (0.827) (0.229) (0.874)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT 0.173 *** 0.066 * 0.097 ** 0.057 0.088 ** 0.046
(<.001) (0.058) (0.020) (0.166) (0.026) (0.241)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 576 679 603 679 642 398
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i  on 
earnings announcement days t  and t+1 ; cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low Attention  is equal to one if the 
earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category given the proxy being used, else zero;  Aggregate  reflects the combined distribution of Friday, 
Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings announcements.  HFT is equal to one if there is high-frequency trading in 
the rest of the day following the earnings announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-median unexpected earnings, else 
zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years and month and year indicators. All 
controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values (reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on earnings announcement days t  to t+1
Low Google 
SearchAggregate Busy Day
Slow Analyst 
Speed
High News 
Distraction Low EDGAR
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Table 4: HFT and Long-term price efficiency 
 
 
Low Attention proxy
 
Low Attention -0.044 -0.083 ** -0.006 -0.04 -0.010 0.055
 (0.230) (0.020) (0.879) (0.492) (0.796) (0.352)
HighUE -0.002 -0.025 0.012 0.01 -0.075 0.027
 (0.983) (0.814) (0.893) (0.919) (0.465) (0.802)
HFT 0.009 -0.054 ** 0.019 -0.013 -0.007 0.065
(0.715) (0.046) (0.443) (0.556) (0.846) (0.169)
Low Attention * HighUE 0.220 *** 0.137 ** 0.155 ** 0.135 * 0.139 ** 0.027
(<.001) (0.025) (0.015) (0.065) (0.038) (0.776)
Low Attention * HFT 0.030 0.084 ** 0.003 0.032 0.005 -0.104 *
(0.442) (0.025) (0.943) (0.589) (0.903) (0.084)
HFT * HighUE 0.042 0.079 0.064 0.023 0.081 -0.024
(0.326) (0.109) (0.200) (0.568) (0.191) (0.761)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT -0.208 *** -0.138 ** -0.173 *** -0.107 * -0.120 * 0.013
(<.001) (0.018) (0.005) (0.071) (0.050) (0.446)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 576 679 603 679 642 398
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i  from 
2 days after earnings announcement day t  to 45 days after; cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low Attention  is 
equal to one if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category given the proxy being used, else zero; Aggregate  reflects the combined 
distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings announcements.  HFT  is equal to one if there is 
high-frequency trading in the rest of the day following the earnings announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-median 
unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years and month 
and year indicators. All controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values (reported below 
coefficient estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on post-earnings-announcement days t+2  to t+45
Aggregate Busy Day
Slow Analyst 
Speed
High News 
Distraction Low EDGAR
Low Google 
Search
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Table 5: Post-close placebo tests
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Post-Close 0.025 0.038
(0.290) (0.351)
HighUE -0.002 0.191
(0.969) (0.189)
HFT 0.016 0.022
(0.472) (0.544)
Post-Close * HighUE -0.052 -0.166
(0.310) (0.176)
Post-Close * HFT -0.015 -0.034
(0.534) (0.412)
HFT * HighUE -0.041 -0.143
(0.392) (0.244)
Post-Close * HighUE * HFT 0.060 0.155
(0.126) (0.109)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 679 679
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) for stock i  on earnings announcement days t  and t+1 
in the first column and day t+2  to t+45 in the second column; cumulative abnormal return is expressed 
in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Post-Close  is equal to one if the earnings announcement occurs 
between 4:00 p.m. and midnight, else zero.  HFT  is equal to one if there is high-frequency trading in 
the rest of the day following the earnings announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the 
announcement has above-median unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls 
market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years and month and year 
indicators. All controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls 
are not reported. P-values (reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates) are based on standard 
errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels.
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t  to t+1
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t+2  to t+45
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Table 6: HFT and non-HFT trading on low-attention versus high-attention earnings announcements
Panel A: Aggregate low-attention vs high-attention earnings announcements 
Low High Low High
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 22.7% 18.7% 0.0027 22.1% 17.7% 0.0043
HFTD 23.9% 21.0% 0.0352 25.2% 20.5% 0.0636
HFTS 21.5% 16.4% 0.0013 16.5% 13.4% 0.0134
HN% 17.7% 16.7% 0.3282 19.0% 16.8% 0.4509
NH% 15.3% 12.1% 0.0051 12.1% 10.5% 0.0328
# Announcements 185 419 185 419
Panel B: Busy day versus quiet day earnings announcements 
Busy Quiet Busy Quiet
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 18.2% 20.9% 0.0076 17.2% 19.8% 0.0111
HFTD 19.6% 23.6% 0.0004 18.2% 24.4% 0.0004
HFTS 16.8% 18.2% 0.2416 13.5% 14.3% 0.1474
HN% 15.7% 18.4% 0.0035 15.0% 19.1% 0.0014
NH% 12.9% 12.9% 0.9973 10.3% 10.8% 0.4842
# Announcements 344 401 344 401
This table presents univariate tests of the percentage of trading by HFTs on low-attention earnings announcements versus 
high-attention earnings announcements. HFT All  measures the percentage of trading volume executed by HFTs;  HFT D 
measures the percentage of trading volume in which HFTs demand liquidity;  HFT S  measures the percentage of trading 
volume in which HFTs supply liquidity; HN%  measures the percentage of trading volume in which HFTs demand and non-
HFTs supply liquidity; and NH%  measures the percentage of trading volume in which non-HFTs demand and HFTs supply 
liquidity. Each panel uses a different measure to identify low-attention (first column) versus high-attention (second column) 
earnings announcements. Panel A compares earnings announcements flagged as high versus low attention under our 
Aggregate attention metric. Panel B compares earnings announcements that occur on days with above-median number of 
other earnings announcements (Busy ) to those that occur on days with below-median number of other earnings 
announcements (Quiet ). Panel C compares earnings announcements with below-median analyst forecast revision speed 
(Slow ) to those with above-median speed (Fast ). Panel D compares earnings announcements that occur on Fridays (Friday ) 
to those that occur on other days of the week (Non-Friday ). Panel E compares earnings announcements with above-median 
number of non-earnings related news  (High News Distraction ) to those with below-median non-earnings news (Low News 
Distraction ).  Panel F compares earnings announcements with below-median EDGAR download volume (Low EDGAR ) to 
those with above-median download volume (High EDGAR ). Panel G compares earnings announcements with below-median 
Google search volume (Low Google ) to those with above-median search volume (High Google ). 
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Panel C: Slow analyst speed  versus fast earnings announcements 
Slow Fast Slow Fast
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 21.2% 18.4% 0.0103 19.8% 18.5% 0.0260
HFTD 23.1% 20.6% 0.0436 24.2% 20.6% 0.0546
HFTS 19.4% 16.2% 0.0112 14.3% 13.8% 0.1494
HN% 17.7% 16.3% 0.1556 17.8% 16.7% 0.1984
NH% 14.0% 11.9% 0.0240 10.9% 10.5% 0.2710
# Announcements 309 322 309 322
Panel D: Friday versus non-Friday earnings announcements
Friday Non-Friday Friday Non-Friday 
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 26.3% 19.1% 0.0001 22.3% 18.3% 0.0002
HFTD 29.2% 21.1% 0.0000 28.3% 21.0% 0.0001
HFTS 23.4% 17.0% 0.0028 17.0% 13.7% 0.0043
HN% 21.7% 16.7% 0.0001 21.6% 16.6% 0.0006
NH% 16.0% 12.7% 0.0377 12.1% 10.4% 0.0240
# Announcements 60 685 60 685
Panel E: High versus low news distraction earnings announcements 
High distraction Low distraction High distraction Low distraction
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 24.0% 16.5% 0.0000 23.3% 16.4% 0.0000
HFTD 25.6% 18.9% 0.0000 26.2% 17.1% 0.0000
HFTS 22.3% 14.0% 0.0000 17.8% 11.6% 0.0000
HN% 19.1% 15.6% 0.0001 19.2% 14.9% 0.0001
NH% 15.8% 10.8% 0.0000 13.4% 9.2% 0.0000
# Announcements 317 428 317 428
Panel F: Low versus high EDGAR download earnings announcements 
Low EDGAR High EDGAR Low EDGAR High EDGAR
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 19.6% 19.9% 0.8286 18.2% 19.1% 0.7325
HFTD 21.2% 22.5% 0.3050 21.2% 22.9% 0.3094
HFTS 18.0% 17.3% 0.5288 14.3% 13.5% 0.8178
HN% 16.5% 17.9% 0.1300 16.6% 17.9% 0.1704
NH% 13.3% 12.7% 0.5403 10.9% 10.4% 0.7478
# Announcements 350 353 350 353
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Panel G:  Low versus high Google search earnings announcements
Low High Low High
Mean Mean p-value Median Median p-value
HFTAll 20.7% 20.4% 0.8335 19.8% 19.6% 0.8883
HFTD 23.5% 22.9% 0.6511 24.7% 23.8% 0.5803
HFTS 17.9% 18.0% 0.9361 14.5% 14.0% 0.9185
HN% 18.4% 18.1% 0.8344 18.0% 18.9% 0.5840
NH% 12.8% 13.3% 0.5895 10.9% 11.3% 0.4616
# Announcements 216 219 216 219
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Table 7: HFT demand versus supply and price efficiency
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Low Attention 0.019 -0.017
(0.164) (0.297)
HighUE -0.002 0.010
(0.969) (0.920)
HFTD-S 0.002 0.010
(0.860) (0.604)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.035 * 0.063 **
(0.079) (0.019)
Low Attention * HFTD-S -0.009 0.003
(0.619) (0.937)
HFTD-S * HighUE 0.006 -0.003
(0.725) (0.921)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFTD-S 0.053 ** -0.064 *
(0.032) (0.067)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 576 576
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without abnormal HFT demand 
versus supply. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) for stock i  on earnings 
announcement days t  and t+1  in the first column and day t+2  to t+45 in the second column; cumulative 
abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low Attention is equal to one if the 
earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category under the Aggregate measure, which reflects 
the combined distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low 
EDGAR earnings announcements. HFT D-S  is equal to one if HFT shares demanded minus supplied for 
stock i  on earnings announcement day t  is greater than the median for stock i  on non-earnings-
announcement days, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-median 
unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings 
surprise volatility over the prior four years and month and year indicators. All controls are also interacted 
with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values (reported in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by announcement 
day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t  to t+1
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t+2  to t+45
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Table 8: HFT and price efficiency for small versus large firms
 
 
 
Low Attention 0.080 ** -0.047
(0.027) (0.298)
HighUE -0.114 * 0.038
(0.056) (0.681)
HFT -0.001 -0.056
(0.944) (0.142)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.150 *** 0.021
(0.003) (0.783)
Low Attention * HFT -0.053 0.050
(0.194) (0.296)
HFT * HighUE -0.011 0.044
(0.719) (0.511)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT 0.172 *** -0.025
(0.002) (0.377)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 276 300
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) for stock i  on earnings announcement days t  and t+1  in Panel A and day t+2  to 
t+45 in Panel B; cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Small Firms (Large 
Firms) are defined as firms with below-median (above-median) market capitalization. Low Attention is equal to one 
if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category under the Aggregate measure, which reflects the 
combined distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings 
announcements.  HFT  is equal to one if there is high-frequency trading in the rest of the day following the earnings 
announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-median unexpected earnings, else 
zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four 
years and month and year indicators. All controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and 
interacted controls are not reported. P-values (reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates) are based on 
standard errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels.
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on earnings announcement days t  to t+1
Small Firms Large Firms
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 Low Attention -0.071 -0.106 **
(0.293) (0.023)
HighUE 0.011 -0.013
(0.941) (0.902)
HFT 0.030 -0.052
(0.440) (0.198)
Low Attention * HighUE 0.268 *** 0.078
(0.004) (0.330)
Low Attention * HFT 0.070 0.086 *
(0.424) (0.083)
HFT * HighUE 0.045 -0.016
(0.418) (0.813)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT -0.280 *** -0.034
(0.006) (0.342)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 276 300
Small Firms Large Firms
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on earnings announcement days t+2  to t+45
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Table 9: HFT and Short-term price efficiency with 1-day and 3-day horizons
 
 
Panel A: One-day Cumulative Abnormal Return
Low Attention proxy
 
Low Attention 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.014
 (0.505) (0.199) (0.465) (0.681) (0.939) (0.393)
HighUE -0.015 -0.018 -0.008 -0.038 -0.010 0.034
(0.667) (0.574) (0.811) (0.246) (0.773) (0.517)
HFT -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.014 -0.016 ** -0.022 *** -0.041 ***
(0.031) (0.020) (0.129) (0.025) (0.008) (0.004)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.034 -0.035 * -0.036 * -0.018 -0.022 -0.024
(0.121) (0.068) (0.076) (0.382) (0.229) (0.414)
Low Attention * HFT -0.008 0.000 -0.016 -0.017 0.010 0.002
(0.625) (0.985) (0.237) (0.246) (0.316) (0.918)
HFT * HighUE 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.006 0.042
(0.265) (0.604) (0.536) (0.216) (0.761) (0.118)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT 0.047 ** 0.026 * 0.039 ** 0.029 * 0.025 0.003
(0.026) (0.089) (0.042) (0.093) (0.115) (0.469)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 576 679 603 679 642 398
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i on 
earnings announcement day t in Panel A  days t-1  to t+1  in Panel B; cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low 
Attention  is equal to one if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category given the proxy being used, else zero;  Aggregate  reflects the 
combined distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings announcements.  HFT  is equal to one if 
there is high-frequency trading in the rest of the day following the earnings announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-
median unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years and 
month and year indicators. All controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values (reported in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on earnings announcement days t 
Aggregate Busy Day
Slow Analyst 
Speed
High News 
Distraction Low EDGAR
Low Google 
Search
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Panel B: Three-day Cumulative Abnormal Return
Low Attention proxy
Low Attention 0.098 *** 0.052 * 0.030 -0.013 0.042 0.055
(0.003) (0.073) (0.336) (0.682) (0.112) (0.214)
HighUE -0.002 -0.023 -0.015 -0.085 * -0.023 -0.047
(0.971) (0.644) (0.735) (0.058) (0.704) (0.549)
HFT 0.037 * 0.019 0.022 0.008 0.032 0.021
(0.083) (0.384) (0.264) (0.673) (0.140) (0.636)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.166 *** -0.110 ** -0.070 -0.008 -0.073 -0.027
(0.001) (0.017) (0.159) (0.895) (0.138) (0.685)
Low Attention * HFT -0.098 *** -0.025 -0.034 -0.003 -0.040 -0.061
(0.005) (0.385) (0.312) (0.927) (0.152) (0.191)
HFT * HighUE -0.033 -0.030 -0.011 0.006 -0.032 0.024
(0.329) (0.404) (0.748) (0.839) (0.475) (0.714)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT 0.183 *** 0.087 ** 0.070 * 0.034 0.083 * 0.031
(<.001) (0.028) (0.100) (0.293) (0.054) (0.333)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 576 679 603 679 642 398
Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on earnings announcement days t-1  to t+1
Aggregate Busy Day
Slow Analyst 
Speed
High News 
Distraction Low EDGAR
Low Google 
Search
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Table 10: HFT and Long-term price efficiency with 30-day horizon
 
 
Low Attention proxy
 
Low Attention -0.016 -0.021 0.009 -0.008 -0.031 0.011
 (0.573) (0.496) (0.782) (0.872) (0.398) (0.748)
HighUE 0.008 0.045 0.017 0.06 -0.057 0.064
 (0.922) (0.576) (0.815) (0.409) (0.473) (0.487)
HFT 0.002 -0.033 0.011 -0.018 -0.022 0.064 *
(0.894) (0.183) (0.542) (0.310) (0.502) (0.098)
Low Attention * HighUE 0.172 *** 0.053 0.102 * 0.092 0.152 *** 0.090
(<.001) (0.280) (0.058) (0.136) (0.005) (0.153)
Low Attention * HFT 0.002 0.031 -0.023 0.009 0.015 -0.031
(0.962) (0.356) (0.501) (0.866) (0.707) (0.415)
HFT * HighUE 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.019 0.079 -0.018
(0.228) (0.345) (0.277) (0.534) (0.108) (0.764)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT -0.148 *** -0.068 * -0.085 * -0.08 * -0.116 ** -0.081
(0.002) (0.094) (0.066) (0.099) (0.021) (0.113)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 576 679 603 679 642 398
p p y p
2 days after earnings announcement day t  to 30 days after; cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low Attention  is 
equal to one if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category given the proxy being used, else zero; Aggregate  reflects the combined 
distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings announcements.  HFT  is equal to one if there is 
high-frequency trading in the rest of the day following the earnings announcement, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-
median unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years 
and month and year indicators. All controls are also interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values 
(reported below coefficient estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on post-earnings-announcement days t+2  to t+30
Aggregate Busy Day
Slow Analyst 
Speed
High News 
Distraction Low EDGAR
Low Google 
Search
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Table 11: HFTs and price efficiency under alternative HFT cutoffs
 
Panel A: HFTs trade more than 5% of the trading volume
Dependent variable 
 
Low Attention 0.051 ** -0.031
(0.040) (0.317)
HighUE 0.014 0.038
(0.753) (0.710)
HFT5% 0.030 * 0.011
(0.079) (0.628)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.090 ** 0.178 ***
(0.024) (<.001)
Low Attention * HFT5% -0.043 0.019
(0.128) (0.597)
HFT5% * HighUE -0.036 0.010
(0.104) (0.783)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT5% 0.094 ** -0.175 ***
(0.015) (0.001)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 576 576
This table presents multivariate tests of price efficiency with versus without HFT using two alternative 
cutoff points. Panel A indentifies events with HFT trading if HFT trading exceeds 5% of trading 
volume. Panel B indentifies events with HFT trading if HFTs trade within 2 hours from earnings 
announcement time. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR ) for stock i  on 
earnings announcement days t  and t+1  in the first column and day t+2  to t+45 in the second column; 
cumulative abnormal return is expressed in decimal form, so 0.01 equals 1%. Low Attention is equal to 
one if the earnings announcement falls into the low-attention category under the Aggregate measure, 
which reflects the combined distribution of Friday, Busy Day, Slow Analyst Speed, High News 
Distraction, and Low EDGAR earnings announcements. HFT 5%  is equal to one if HFT trading exceeds 
5% of trading volume after earnings announcment time for stock i  on earnings announcement day t , else 
zero; HFT2hour is equal to one if HFTs trade within 2 hours from earnings announcement time for stock i 
on earnings announcement day t, else zero; HighUE  is equal to one if the announcement has above-
median unexpected earnings, else zero. Regressions also include as controls market capitalization and 
earnings surprise volatility over the prior four years and month and year indicators. All controls are also 
interacted with HighUE; the intercept, controls, and interacted controls are not reported. P-values 
(reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates) are based on standard errors that are clustered by 
announcement day. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t  to t+1
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t+2  to t+45
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Panel B: HFTs trade within 2 hours after announcement time
Dependent variable 
 
Low Attention 0.024 -0.033
(0.112) (0.359)
HighUE -0.024 0.019
(0.587) (0.853)
HFT2hour 0.007 -0.007
(0.598) (0.777)
Low Attention * HighUE -0.049 ** 0.100 *
(0.032) (0.050)
Low Attention * HFT2hour -0.013 0.022
(0.505) (0.555)
HFT2hour * HighUE 0.005 0.014
(0.797) (0.669)
Low Attention * HighUE * HFT2hour 0.060 ** -0.100 **
(0.015) (0.039)
Controls (Interacted) yes yes
# Observations 576 576
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t  to t+1
CAR on 
earnings announcement 
days t+2  to t+45
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Figure 1: HFT effects on short-horizon cumulative abnormal returns 
This graph depicts the marginal effects on post-earnings-announcement days t  to t+1 , comparing the coefficients 
of interest from regressions in Table 3. Low Attention * High UE is the classic low-atteniton effect, and Low 
Attention * High UE * HFT is the marginal effect of HFT trading on low attention high-earnings-surprise 
announcements. Asterisks following the low-attention proxy labels indicate that the marginal effect of HFT is 
significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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Figure 2: HFT effects on long-horizon cumulative abnormal returns 
This graph depicts the marginal effects on post-earnings-announcement days t+2  to t+45 ,comparing the 
coefficients of interest from regressions in Table 4. Low Attention * High UE is the classic low-atteniton effect, 
and Low Attention * High UE * HFT  is the marginal effect of HFT trading on low attention high-earnings-
surprise announcements. Asterisks following the low-attention proxy labels indicate that the marginal effect of 
HFT is significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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